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I argue that progress in understanding economic development (as in other branches of economics)
must come from the investigation of mechanisms; the associated empirical analysis can usefully employ
a wide range of experimental and non-experimental methods. I discuss three different areas of research:
the life-cycle saving hypothesis and its implication that economic growth drives higher rates of national
saving, the theory of speculative commodity storage and its implications for the time-series behavior
of commodity prices, and the relationship between economic growth and nutritional improvement.
None of these projects has yet been entirely successful in offering a coherent account of the evidence,
but all illustrate a process of trial and error, in which although mechanisms are often rejected, unlikely
theoretical propositions are sometimes surprisingly verified, while in all cases there is a process of









Economic development differs from most fields in economics because the study of low-
income economies, and of people living in low-income economies, draws on all branches of 
economics. The particular study of economic growth is perhaps closest to being a field like labor 
or health economics, but what is currently referred to as development economics is broader, so 
that, although my examples involve important issues in economic development, my conclusions 
apply more broadly to other areas of applied economics. In an earlier paper, I have argued that 
learning about development requires us to investigate mechanisms (Deaton, 2009). Finding out 
about how people in low-income countries can and do escape from poverty is unlikely to come 
from the empirical evaluation of actual projects or programs, whether through randomized trials 
or econometric methods that are designed to extract defensible causal inferences, unless such 
analysis tries to discover why projects work rather than whether they work—however important 
the latter might be for purposes of auditing. By contrast, investigation, testing, and modification 
of mechanisms that can be widely applied, at least potentially, allows the integration of disparate 
empirical findings and comprises a progressive empirical research strategy.  
  In this paper, I discuss three lines of work that have elucidated mechanisms that are relevant 
for development: 1) connections between saving and growth; 2) the determinants of commodity 
prices, which are a key source of income for many developing countries; and 3) some 
unexpected puzzles that arise in considering the linkages between  income and food 
consumption. In each case, my discussion illustrates what Cartwright (2007) calls the positivist 
approach to the hypothetico-deductive method. In this approach, mechanisms are proposed, key 
predictions derived and tested, and if falsified, the mechanisms are rejected or modified. If the 
predictions of a mechanism are confirmed, if they are sufficiently specific, and if they are hard to 
explain in other ways, we attach additional credence to the mechanism, albeit provisionally since 2 
 
later evidence may undermine it. Sometimes the falsifications can be repaired by changing 
supplementary assumptions, and sometimes they involve long steps backwards when the model 
is abandoned, and there is often disagreement about which is the correct response. But the end 
result is an accumulation of useful knowledge and understanding.   
 
Theory and Simple Observation: Savings and Growth 
 
  In a famous 1954 paper, Arthur Lewis (p. 155) wrote that “the central problem in the theory 
of economic development is to understand the process by which a community which was 
previously saving, and investing, 4 or 5 percent. of its national income or less, converts itself into 
an economy where voluntary saving is running at about 12 to 15 percent. of national income or 
more. This is the central problem because the central fact of economic development is rapid 
capital accumulation.” Since that paper, economists have been proposing theories to explain 
saving and testing the implications of those theories in a research agenda that continues to pose 
questions for modern researchers. In this case, a number of the key tests involve straightforward 
observations that require no more than a cross tabulation or a two-dimensional graph—but what 
to put in the table or the  graph was not at all obvious until the theory was developed to show the 
way.  
  At the same time Lewis (1954) was writing, Modigliani and Brumberg (1954a, 1954b 
[1990]) developed the life-cycle theory of saving, a mechanism that specifies how, why, and how 
much people will save. Their main focus was not economic development, but rather an attempt 
to provide a theoretically coherent account that could make sense of a mass of disorganized pre-
existing empirical evidence from time-series and cross-sectional data. Their attempt was a 
brilliant success, and it still provides a useful framework for thinking about saving. It turned out 3 
 
that the life-cycle theory also had important implications for the relationship between saving and 
growth, a link that was further developed by Modigliani (1966, 1970) who, in the second paper, 
took the predictions to international data.  He showed that if people saved when they were 
young, and dissaved when they were old, both population growth and per capita income growth 
will increase the national saving rate; with population growth, there are more savers than 
dissevers, and with economic growth, the former are richer than the latter, so that their saving 
more than offsets the dissaving of their elders. If these predictions seem obvious now, they do 
not follow, for example, from a representative agent model which necessarily lacks a range of 
ages within a population. The theory further predicts that saving rates should be independent of 
the level of development, because everything is scaled in proportion to income, should be zero 
when growth is zero, because the saving of the young exactly matches the dissaving of the old, 
and that, in simple cases, the relationship between the saving rate and the growth rate should be a 
concave function whose parameters are determined by the ratio of the retirement to the work 
span, see Deaton (1997, pp 45–7) for an exposition.  
   In the 1970 paper, Modigliani drew on earlier work by Houthakker (1965), and pulled 
together the evidence available at that time, and showed that, indeed, saving rates are higher in 
more rapidly growing economies, a correlation that remains true today. He also confirmed that 
the level of development did not predict the saving rate, and that the size of the growth effect on 
saving matched what would be expected from earlier work fitting the model to time-series data 
from the United States. The life-cycle mechanism could thus offer a broad integration of widely 
dispersed evidence, from cross-sections, from time-series, from international comparisons, and 
from both rich and poor countries.  4 
 
  Of course, a correlation between growth and saving rates is hardly a surprise, and is predicted 
by other theories. Before Solow’s (1956) paper, growth models predicted a simple mechanical 
link from saving to growth, which is what Lewis (1954) had in mind, and which Modigliani 
(1970) recognized and compared with the life-cycle account. After Solow, with the 
understanding that, in the long-run, growth rates do not depend on the saving rate, it is still the 
case that higher saving rates will generate higher growth along a potentially long-lived 
transitional path (Atkinson, 1969). Yet Modigliani’s insight provided a new mechanism for an 
old correlation, and freed development economists to think of explanations for economic growth 
that did not depend on an increase in saving, with life-cycle saving providing the needed finance 
in response to the growth. His paper also illustrates the importance of something that is often 
neglected: the need to develop the theory, often with substantial additional work, until it delivers 
propositions that are non-obvious and that can readily and transparently be taken to the data. 
Modigliani’s propositions were remarkable for their specificity.  It is not simply that growth and 
saving should be correlated, but the relationship has a specific form, dependent on other 
observable quantities, and the relationship needs to be consistent with different relationships 
estimated on both cross-section and time-series data.  
  These predictions held up remarkably well for a long period of time, for two further decades, 
until they faced an empirical challenge based on a very simple observation. Carroll and Summers 
(1995) noted that, if the life-cycle theory were true, the cross-sectional age-profiles of 
consumption should rotate clockwise with the rate of economic growth. Younger cohorts of 
consumers have greater life-time resources than older cohorts of consumers, so that, whatever 
are people’s preferences for the shape of their age profiles of consumption—provided only that 
those preferences are the same in all countries—the ratio of young people’s to old people’s 5 
 
consumption in the momentary cross-section should be higher in more rapidly growing 
economies. In the simplest case, people might like their consumption to be the same at all ages, 
so that if we could track individuals, their consumption would not change as they age. If we 
compare a fast growing with a slow growing economy, young people in the former are lifetime 
richer relative to old people than are young people in the latter, so that the consumption of the 
young relative to the old will be higher in the more rapidly growing economy. If the preference is 
for consumption to grow with age, the age-profile of consumption will rise in a zero growth 
economy, but rotate clockwise as the rate of growth increases. That countries have the same 
preferences is a strong assumption, but is required in some form to get Modigliani’s (1970) 
original correlation, so it entirely appropriate for testing the theory. Carroll and Summers’ idea is 
easy enough to understand and describe, at least with hindsight, but was certainly not obvious in 
advance. Moreover, testing this prediction requires data only on consumption and age from a 
single household survey, and does not require microeconomic data on savings. (Just as the 
explorers who tried to find the source of the Nile were long frustrated by the Sudd, the giant 
impenetrable swamp that separates the sources of the Nile from its main channels in Sudan and 
Egypt, so the giant impenetrable data swamp that prevents us from connecting microeconomic 
and macroeconomic data on saving has long prevented the tracing of national saving back to its 
sources in household behavior.) Carroll and Summers’ prediction required no more econometrics 
than a handful of graphs, which showed that the age-profiles of consumption are remarkably 
similar in slow growing and fast growing economies, which means that life-cycle saving cannot 
account for the positive association between growth and saving. Deaton (1997, pp 53–6) extends 
this argument to other poor and rich countries.  6 
 
  This is straightforward hypothetico-deductive methodology: a prediction is tested, the tests 
fail, and the hypothesis is wrong. There are other supporting contradictions. For example, the 
long decline in the U.S. saving rate (reversed only very recently) is not a consequence of slower 
growth; conversely, the rise in saving rates in several East Asian countries is not the result of 
their faster rates of growth. Neither can be attributed to the aggregation effects across birth-
cohorts that drive the life-cycle correlation, and in both cases, households of all ages appear to 
have changed their saving behavior for reasons that we do not fully understand (Bosworth, 
Burtless and Sabelhaus, 1991;  Paxson, 1996; Deaton and Paxson, 2000; Parker, 2000). Although 
the data on saving rates by age are weak—saving is the difference between two large numbers, 
both of which are hard to measure—it  is clear that there is not enough life-cycle saving—and 
that it happens too late in life and too close to the age of dissaving—to permit changes in the rate 
of growth to have much of an effect on the average saving rate (Kotlikoff and Summers, 1991; 
Gourinchas and Parker, 2000). 
  I want to draw several methodological lessons from this story. Although I believe that the 
life-cycle mechanism has been falsified as a general proposition, the evidence should be 
interpreted as showing that its range of applicability is smaller than we thought, not that the 
mechanism is never relevant. People do save for retirement, and governments sometimes do so 
on their behalf, and those mechanisms have a role to play in understanding well-being over the 
life-cycle, as well as the supply of savings in general. But the life-cycle mechanism alone is not 
capable of explaining the international correlation between saving and growth. Indeed, the life-
cycle model was always of doubtful relevance in poor countries, where the widespread existence 
of extended families reduces the need for formal life-cycle saving. The falsification of the 
hypothesis as a general proposition has been fruitful in stimulating new research on behavioral 7 
 
approaches to saving in both rich and poor countries. So we are certainly not left with nothing, 
even if there are things that we thought we understood but no longer do. We have a more 
nuanced and qualified understanding of the life-cycle mechanisms, and a useful agenda for future 
research. Perhaps Lewis was broadly right, and we are certainly now free to consider causation 
from saving to growth as well as from growth to saving, and to look for other mechanisms; 
candidates might be habit formation by consumers, Carroll and Weil (1994), or low rates of 
investment in poor countries, Hsieh and Klenow (2007). 
  I also want to emphasize the importance of the work that is intermediate between theory and 
data and that was required to find specific and transparently testable predictions, like 
Modigliani’s (1970)  derivation of the link between saving, growth, and the length of work and 
retirement spans, and Carroll and Summers’ (1995) work on age-profiles of consumption. This 
kind of intermediate work is not econometrics, nor is it theory as usually understood, but it is 
work that can only be done by those with a familiarity with the theory and an understanding of 
the evidence that is available or might be made available. 
 
 
Structural Modeling: Understanding Commodity Prices 
 
 
  Many low-income countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, depend on primary 
commodities for a large share of their exports. For these countries, fluctuations in the world 
prices of commodities pose difficult problems of macroeconomic management. The dynamics of 
commodity prices are characterized by long periods of quiescence, interrupted by dramatic 8 
 
upward flares and downward plunges. In theory, a country might save when prices are high 
against times when prices are low, but commodity prices are highly positively autocorrelated, so 
that strategies to smooth government or household expenditure would often requiring periods of 
saving and dissaving that are too long to be within the borrowing or lending capacity—or indeed 
the political patience—of the countries involved. Indeed, there have been many spectacular 
disasters in history. The boom in cotton prices during the American Civil War funded a huge and 
not easily reversible increase in state expenditure in Egypt that eventually led to the collapse of 
the government and to the country’s takeover by Britain, (Issawi, 1966). Nor have international 
organizations been better at understanding and predicting commodity prices; during the 1970s 
and  1980s, as commodity prices collapsed, the World Bank consistently revised upwards its 
forecasts of copper and cotton price, until prices a few years ahead were predicted to be four to 
five times their current or subsequently realized prices, encouraging producer countries to indebt 
themselves to an eventually unsustainable degree (Powell, 1991; Deaton, 1999). 
  A coherent mechanism for commodity price fluctuations was first developed by Gustafson 
(1958).  The model is one of speculative storage. There is an underlying process of agricultural 
supply and demand, primarily driven by supply shocks that are either independent and identically 
distributed or at most mildly autocorrelated. However, the effects of these shocks on market 
prices are filtered by the actions of profit-maximizing and risk-neutral speculators who use a 
costly storage technology to buy when commodities are relatively cheap in the expectation of 
selling when they are relatively dear.  In normal times, when speculators are holding stocks, the 
price of the commodity must be expected to rise by enough to cover the speculators interest and 
storage costs; otherwise they would hold nothing. This is consistent with price fluctuations but, 
over periods when stocks are being held, price will rise on average.  9 
 
However, when prices get too high—above the “stockout” price—speculators drop out of the 
market, and no inventory is carried forward. When that happens, there is no storage buffer to 
prevent a price spike in the event of a harvest failure in the next period. If a series of bad harvests 
occurs—as in the seven lean years of the Bible—inventories will eventually be exhausted, and 
prices will reach historically high levels until normal times return. In spite of the trend increase 
in price when inventories are held, there will always come a time when the price is too high to 
support speculation, and the price will collapse; the model predicts no long run trend in price.  
  In a series of papers, Deaton and Laroque (1992, 1996) have investigated the properties of 
this mechanism, and whether it fits the data for a range of commodity prices. The analysis starts 
from the simplest case where the shocks to the harvest are normal, independently and identically 
distributed; then numerically solves for the (policy) function that links the prices to the amount 
of inventory on hand; and finally simulates the time-series and distributions of prices. The 
calculated series show some of the properties of actual prices, such as the evident nonlinearity 
and the price flares, but the patterns of autocorrelation are wrong, and it is the autocorrelation 
that is the central feature of the policy problem for commodity exporting states.   
  Many of the standard criticisms of structural modeling apply to this work. It is difficult to 
disentangle the auxiliary assumptions from the central core that we want to test, the 
computations are time-consuming and error-prone, the substance of the problem tends to be lost 
in the sometimes byzantine complexity and programming of the estimation, and it is hard to get a 
sense of why the results are what they are. But the calculations yielded a crucial insight that 
could have obtained from the beginning, had we been able to see it. In normal times,  when 
stocks are being held, price is expected to rise, and autocorrelation is high. However, when 
prices rise to the cutoff point at which speculators stop holding inventories, the price is expected 10 
 
to stay where it is. If we plot the expected value of tomorrow’s price against today’s price, the 
graph—the autoregression function—is a straight line through the origin with slope greater than 
1 up to some critical price—the stockout price—after which it is constant. We first discovered 
this pattern from graphs of simulations based on estimation, and then proved the result more 
generally. This prediction allows a transparent test of (one aspect of) the model, a prediction that 
is falsified on the data; there is no evidence that the actual autoregression function flattens out at 
high levels of prices. When commodity prices are high, a simple first-order linear autoregressive 
model makes better predictions than does the speculative storage model (Deaton and Laroque, 
1996, Figure 1). Indeed, it is precisely because the autocorrelation is so high at all levels of 
prices that it is so hard for governments of commodity exporting countries or their advisors to 
smooth their incomes. 
  As in the saving and growth example, we finish up without a satisfactory model, but once 
again we have learned something about when the mechanism works and when it does not. Our 
failure points to good future directions such as exploring the role of demand for commodities, 
which is driven by income and thus tends to be strongly autocorrelated, something that is taken 
up by Dvir and Rogoff’s (2009) study of the historical price of oil. One methodological lesson 
that I want to draw here is that the simulation and estimation of tightly specified models may 
reveal regularities and behaviors that are worth investigating as possible generalizations and that 
can lead, in favorable cases, to “acid tests” of the theory. In effect, we are using the computer to 
think for us. Structural estimation is useful, not only for the estimates (whose credibility is often 
undercut by the panoply of supporting assumptions that are required to obtain them), but for 
understanding the empirical predictions of the theory.  
 11 
 
Measurement in Search Of Theory: Two Food Puzzles 
 
  My third example contrasts with the first two because it begins from observations, rather than 
from theory, and illustrates the interplay of mechanisms and data from a different starting point. 
  When many people think about global poverty, they think about hunger, about people who 
regularly do not have enough to eat because they are too poor to buy food, about children being 
abnormally susceptible to disease because they are undernourished, about those children growing 
up abnormally thin (wasted) and abnormally short (stunted), and about the long-term 
consequences for their physical and mental health, and ability to earn a living. It seems obvious 
enough that higher income is the solution to hunger and indeed, when we look across richer and 
poorer households at any moment of time, households with higher incomes get more calories, 
more protein, and more fat. This is true whether we compare the average household in India with 
the average household in the US—where we typically worry about too much consumption, not 
too little—or whether we compare rich and poor households within low-income countries, like 
India. By the same token, food consumption seems like a good proxy for living standards more 
broadly, and there is a long tradition of research, going back to Ernst Engel in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, that attempts to use food consumption to make inferences about living 
standards, particularly about how we might infer individual welfare from household data by 
adjusting incomes for the numbers and demographic composition of households. However, the 
data on food consumption presents several challenges to this seemingly straightforward 
framework.  
  A first puzzle arises out of the measurement of household economies of scale. As was long 
ago documented by Simon Kuznets (1976), virtually all household surveys, in rich and poor 12 
 
countries alike, show that total household expenditure rises with household size while per capita 
household expenditure falls with household size. In consequence, when comparing whether 
larger households are poorer than smaller households on a per capita basis, or whether children 
are more likely to be in poverty than adults, the welfare comparison across households will 
depend on the degree of economies of scale. One way to tackle this comparison problem was 
originally suggested by Jean Drèze in personal conversation. If we compare larger with smaller 
households who have the same per capita income, the larger households will be better off in the 
presence of economies of scale. Better-off people spend more on food, so the increase in per 
capita food expenditure for the larger households should give us an idea of the income equivalent 
of economies of scale. But when Christina Paxson and I did the empirical work in 1998, we 
found that larger households actually spend less per head on food than do smaller households 
with the same per capita expenditure or income. On the face of it, better-off people spend less 
per person on food! This pattern holds true for a wide range of rich and poor countries. Even 
more strangely, the extent of the reduction was largest in the poorest countries where food is 
scarcest, and the slope of the overall Engel curve relationship between income and quantity of 
food consumed is the steepest.  
  Clearly, something is seriously wrong with the simple theory. Exactly what is unclear. One 
possible set of answers considers how household size or even household income may adjust to 
food scarcity, or to third factors that are correlated with food, but these approaches have not 
offered much of a handle on the puzzle. Note that economies of scale in food preparation, which 
almost certainly exist, make the puzzle worse because they lower the effective price of food and 
encourage its consumption. Another possible resolution is that the price elasticity of food is 
relatively high, so that the equivalent price reduction from the economies of scale may cause 13 
 
enough substitution away from food to offset the income effect. Yet this explanation is surely 
implausible for people who are poor and malnourished. This example is perhaps better classed as 
a puzzle or a paradox than a falsification, but only because the mechanism on which it is based 
seems so obvious, that malnourished people will consume more food when they have more 
money.  
  A related and even starker puzzle, investigated by Deaton and Drèze (2009),  is that in spite 
of recent startlingly high rates of growth of per capita income and per capita consumption in 
India, per capita calorie consumption has been falling for quarter of a century. In rural India, per 
capita intake fell from 2,240 calories per person per day in 1983 to 2,047 in 2004–05 while, in 
urban India, calorie consumption remained constant at around 2,000 per person. Although the 
evidence is less clear, per capita calorie consumption appears also to have fallen in China, in 
spite of even more rapid rates of growth (Du, Lu, Zhai and Popkin, 2002). Clark, Huberman and 
Lindert (1992) argue that the same probably happened in Britain during the industrial revolution 
from 1770 to 1850. Although the amount of poverty reduction in India is modest compared with 
what might be expected from its growth in national income, there have been real gains 
throughout the income distribution, in rural as well as urban areas. As a result, the calorie decline 
cannot be attributed to massive redistribution from poor to rich, nor to some generalized—but 
unmeasured—impoverishment among the rural poor. Most of the decline is accounted for by 
cereal consumption; the trend reduction in “coarse” cereals—sorghum, millet, maize—is more 
than 50 years old, but in recent years it has been supplemented by declines in consumption of 
rice and wheat. Reductions in protein match reductions in calories, and although there has been 
an increase in per capita consumption of fats, this has not been sufficient to increase total per 14 
 
capita calorie consumption. (Indians, unlike Americans, consume less fat than is desirable for 
their health.) 
  The calorie reduction does not reflect an adequacy of nutritional status in India. Indian 
women are among the shortest in the world (Deaton, 2007), and 35.6 percent of adult women 
have a body-mass index (calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared) 
below the World Health Organization minimum of 18.5, a fraction exceeded only by Eritrea, and 
higher than any other country in Asia or sub-Saharan Africa, where per capita income levels are 
much lower than India’s. The rates of child wasting and stunting in India are also among the 
highest in the world, although there has been improvement in all of these nutritional indicators 
over time. One indicator of comparative rates of improvement is the rate at which adult height is 
increasing over time. This is about 0.56 cm per decade for men in India, but only 0.18 for 
women—a rate of improvement that is about half the rate in China, or the historical rate of 
improvement in the high-income European countries. (Interestingly, these Chinese and European 
rates of growth in adult height are actually lower than the contemporary rate of growth in Kerala, 
a state in southwestern India, where there is also no differential between men and women.) So 
the general rate of improvement in nutritional status in India, although real, has been relatively 
slow, in spite of the unprecedented growth in per capita national incomes over the period.  
  What mechanism could account for these outcomes? It is certainly not an increase in the 
relative price of food or of calories, which has declined during most of the period. I suspect, as 
others have earlier suspected (Rao, 2000, 2005), that the reduction in calorie intake in India, and 
perhaps elsewhere, comes from a reduction in physical activity levels associated with some 
movement out of agriculture along with the increasing mechanization of agriculture and of 
transportation—replacing human with mechanical power, facilitated by large improvements in 15 
 
road infrastructure. It may also be associated with the improvements in health associated with a 
huge expansion over the last 25 years in the availability of piped water so that fewer calories are 
lost to diarrheal disease and to intestinal parasites.  
  It is not difficult to construct a simple model of this process, in which people use calories for 
two purposes: their own nutrition, and for heavy physical labor, fueled mostly by cereals. 
Laborers have different abilities to work, through health or strength, and those who work harder 
use more calories for work, and earn more money. At a moment in time, in a single labor market 
with a common wage, the relationship from strength to income through work and calorie 
consumption will induce a positive relationship between income and calorie consumption, the 
familiar positively sloped calorie Engel curve. But as real wages rise, either across space or over 
time, physical labor will decline and calorie consumption for work will fall, even as the calorie 
consumption for improving nutritional status is increasing but still inadequate. Over time, as 
people become rich enough so that manual labor makes minimal nutritional demands, there will 
be no further fall from this cause, and increases in income will be associated with increases in 
calories and nutritional status. Eventually, among the richest inhabitants of poor countries, as 
among the rich inhabitants of rich countries, increases in income will lead to increased intake and 
eventually to “over”-nutrition and its associated health risks. 
  That said, there is not much direct evidence for this mechanism, and it is controversial, 
among those who interpret the calorie decline as evidence of impoverishment (for example, 
Patnaik, 2007).  In favor of the theory, the time series decline in caloric consumption is matched 
by a negative association between per capita calorie consumption and per capita total 
expenditure at the state level so that, for example, the lowest per capita calorie consumption is in 
relatively well-off and well-nourished states like Kerala. Children have better anthropometrics 16 
 
when they live in parts of India where per capita calorie consumption is lower. There is also a 
pronounced decline over time in reports of hunger, and there is a positive correlation between 
hunger and per capita calorie consumption. All of this is indirect evidence, and we have no direct 
measure of the fall in physical effort in agriculture that would be required to uphold this 
argument, given that the movement out of agriculture has been small. Indeed, in the latest round 
of the Gallup World Poll, while 80 percent of rural Indians said that their work involved a lot of 
physical effort, fully 41 percent said that their work involved more effort than five years 
previously. Nor is there any obvious link to the first puzzle, in the form of evidence that larger 
households can achieve the same per capita income with less physical labor by each person, for 
example through economies of scale in production that outweigh the economies of scale in 
consumption. 
  This work is at a relatively early stage. We have anomalous observations that are replicated 
in a number of settings and that are hard to explain. Alternative mechanisms are only just being 
developed, and are some way from delivering sharp non-obvious predictions that are not part of 
what we were trying to explain in the first place. Indeed, in this case we are trying to work back 
from the data to a theory, not the other way round. But the interplay between theory and data is 
the same, and it makes no difference where we join the cycle. 
 
Conclusions: What Do We Learn About Methods? 
 
  The general methodology that fits all of these cases is the hypothetico-deductive method; 
hypotheses are formed, and predictions deduced that can, at least in principle, be falsified on the 
data. In its strict form, as formulated by Karl Popper (1934), the method tests predictions, and 17 
 
looks for falsification; there is no possibility of confirmation, and falsification is the  only way 
that we learn. In the weaker or positivist form, we formulate hypotheses and derive predictions, 
what I have referred to here as “acid tests,” that are hard to explain if the theory is not true, so 
that we seem to learn at least something when the predictions are  confirmed. The best example 
here of an acid test is the precisely-specified and parameter-free relationship between growth and 
saving rates that comes out of the stripped-down life-cycle model, and whose match with the 
existing evidence was an uncanny piece of wizardry. Yet as this case illustrates, such 
corroborations are strictly provisional and are subject to revision in the light of new evidence, or 
of a deeper analysis of the theory. Any fact that is consistent with one theory is consistent with 
an infinite number of theories.  We can also learn from falsification about which parts of the 
theory are wrong, which supplementary assumptions need to be modified, or under what 
circumstances the theory does not hold. We are making progress, learning more about 
mechanisms as we go.   
  Nothing in this process is unfamiliar to applied economists. We argue in this style all the 
time, arguing that a regression coefficient or a stylized fact is consistent with one model and 
inconsistent with another; there is nothing difficult or unfamiliar about this way of working 
though spectacular examples such as the life-cycle model, that shift whole areas of enquiry, are 
necessarily rare. While individual findings are often easily explained by other theories, or 
contradictions easily removed by changing auxiliary assumptions, I do not think there can be real 
doubt that the profession as a whole makes progress. The endless cycling of fashion in 
development thought among policymakers is more an indication of the bankruptcy of the aid 
enterprise than of the underlying scientific understanding. None of this means that anything goes, 
or that good methods have no payoff. I am sure we make most progress when theory and 18 
 
empirical work are closely articulated, not necessarily in the same person, but at least when 
different people with different skills read and talk to one another. Good tests require deep 
understanding of models, and the ability to manipulate them into delivering predictions that are 
not obvious and that are specific enough to the model to be informative about it. At the same 
time, good theories, or good modifications of existing theories, require theorists who are familiar 
with and pay attention to historical and empirical evidence. My main concern with current 
practice in development economics is that these links are weak and that much empirical work 
makes no attempt to investigate mechanisms. 
  Instrumental variables and randomized trials can play a role in uncovering the mechanisms of 
development. Indeed, an instrumental variable strategy is often readily interpretable in the 
hypothetico-deductive framework; if the instrument works as designed, it should affect the 
outcome variable, often in a surprising and interesting way, an “acid test” in its own right. 
Randomized trials have a powerful ability to isolate one mechanism from another; in particular, 
an experiment will often allow us to short-circuit the often difficult process of developing 
theoretical mechanisms to the point where they can be convincingly tested on non-experimental 
data.  At the same time, the routine use of instrumental variable methods and of randomized 
controlled trials for project evaluation is often uninformative about why the results are what they 
are, and in such cases, nothing is learned about mechanisms that can be applied elsewhere. 
  I want to end with a final note on measurement, especially descriptive measurement 
motivated by low-level theory. Few students of economic development will learn much about 
measurement in their graduate courses, which is a pity. The basic facts of economic 
development, such as the growth rates of GDP, come from measures that ought to be much more 
deeply debated than is the case. GDP is a poor measure of welfare to start with, and many 19 
 
important developing countries, China and India being only the leading examples, have weak 
statistical systems that are most likely overstating their rates of growth (Deaton, 2005). The 
microeconomic data on income and consumption from the surveys are also weak, and in many 
countries show growth rates of mean consumption that are considerably lower than the 
corresponding estimates from the national accounts, which raises a huge barrier to understanding 
the relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction. Back to the Sudd.   
  The macroeconomic data in the Penn World Tables and the World Development Indicators 
rest on the calculation of price indexes based on comparing prices in different countries, a task 
that is accomplished on an irregular basis by the International Comparison Program (ICP), whose 
latest round gathered information for 2005. These data underpin a large fraction of what 
development economists think they know about economic growth, yet the assumptions that go 
into these price indexes are not widely debated or even understood. In particular, we do not know 
how to make comparisons between countries whose patterns of relative prices and consumption 
are very different from one another. For example, the ratio of US to Indian per capita GDP is 1.6 
times larger in Indian prices than it is in American prices, and while the ICP resolves that 
difference, essentially by splitting the difference, it is unclear why such an average is 
economically interesting. Beyond that, the ICP protocols require the pricing of closely matched 
goods in disparate countries, e.g. Kellogg’s cornflakes or 2003 Bordeaux superieur in Kenya, 
Senegal, Cameroon, Japan, and Britain. Again it is unclear whether these are the right 
comparisons, and whether matching precisely specified goods holds quality constant in a way 
that yields useful welfare comparisons. Yet again, when comparing two countries, the ICP 
constructs price indexes by weighting individual prices by what is effectively the average of the 
budget shares in both, so that a very expensive good that is consumed by almost no one in a poor 20 
 
country can have a large downward effect on the measured per capita consumption or GDP in 
international currency. And these are only a few of the issues that pose unsolved practical or 
theoretical problems, see Deaton and Heston (2010), Deaton (2010). Yet our measures of  
global poverty and inequality, as well as of progress over time in growth and poverty reduction, 
depend on the as yet elusive solution to the problems of making such comparisons. The same is 
true for at least some of the literature that uses the Penn World Table for running cross country 
regressions, Johnson, Larson, Papageorgiou, and Subramanian (2009). These problems cannot be 
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